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Making Sex Matter: Common Restrooms
as “Intimate” Spaces?*
David B. Cruz†
Abstract
This Essay identifies and critiques a common trope used in
litigation and public policy debates by opponents of allowing
transgender people to use common restrooms (multi-user/shared
gendered restrooms) consistent with their gender identity rather
than the sex they were assigned at birth. The rhetorical tactic they
use is to characterize such facilities as “intimate” spaces.
This Essay considers and rejects four conceptions of intimacy
that the restrooms-as-intimate-spaces trope might be invoking. It
examines notions of intimacy as relational, intimacy as a sharing of
personal information, intimacy as emotional safety, and intimacy as
in intimate anatomical parts. This Essay argues that each notion
fails either to accurately describe common restrooms or to justify
denying transgender persons gender-appropriate access to such
facilities, or both.
Finally, this Essay suggests that deployments of the “intimate”
spaces trope seek to make sex matter more in a time when sex/gender
divisions seem again to be widely criticized. Those who embrace the
intimate restrooms trope are trying to insist upon an intimacy of
sex/gender, an intimacy among the sex classes of men and of women,
an imagined sex intimacy whose phantasmatic character might help
explain why they do not appear to regard various exemptions from
laws designed to police common restroom usage as compromising the
“intimacy” of those spaces that they claim transgender people violate.
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Introduction
On February 19, 2021, the Gloucester County School Board
(the School Board) returned to the Supreme Court of the United
States once again to seek certiorari in its litigation with Gavin
Grimm over his access as a transgender person to gendered
restrooms consistent with his gender identity.1 Gavin, a young
transgender man, sued the School Board in 2015, after his
sophomore year of high school, when it adopted a policy stripping
him of his access to the boys’ restroom.2 He argued that the School
Board’s policy violated his rights under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), which forbids sex discrimination in
educational programs receiving federal funding, and under the
Equal Protection Clause.3 He initially secured a preliminary
injunction in June of 2016, but the Supreme Court stayed it later
that summer4 and granted certiorari in October.5 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had deferred to the Obama-era
Department of Education’s interpretation of Title IX as requiring
transgender students be allowed to use gendered restrooms
consistent with their gender identity,6 but that guidance was
withdrawn just 33 days into the Trump administration.7 Thereafter
the Supreme Court, in March of 2017, vacated the judgment below
and remanded the case for further consideration by the Court of
Appeals in light of that withdrawal.8 Ultimately, the Court of
Appeals held, in August of 2020, that the School Board had violated
Grimm’s rights under both Title IX and the Equal Protection
Clause.9 It is this Fourth Circuit decision for which the School
Board sought Supreme Court review, but the Court rebuffed its
efforts in June of 2021.10
Gavin Grimm’s case is perhaps the most high-profile litigation
involving conflicts over restroom use by transgender people. But in

1. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Grimm, 141 S.
Ct. 2878 (2021) (Mem.) (No. 20-1163), 2021 WL 723101.
2. Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 3d 730, 736–38 (E.D. Va.
2018).
3. Id. at 738.
4. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 136 S. Ct. 2442 (2016)
(Mem.).
5. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016) (Mem.).
6. Grimm, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 740.
7. Id.
8. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017)
(Mem.).
9. Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586 (4th Cir. 2020).
10. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Grimm, 141 S. Ct. 2878 (June 28, 2021).
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recent years, the issue of transgender persons’ access to gendered,
multi-user restrooms—which this Essay will call “common
restrooms” (or sometimes just “restrooms”)—consistent with their
gender identity—which I’ll question-beggingly refer to as “genderappropriate” or “appropriate access”—has been an extremely
contentious one in the United States.11 Opponents of such usage,
denominated here as “opponents” for convenience, have deployed a
variety of rhetorical moves. The focus of this Essay is the common
assertion by opponents that restrooms are “intimate spaces,” and
therefore, by reasoning often apparently left implicit, that
transgender persons should not be permitted to use restrooms
consistent with their gender identity.
After introducing the issue further, this Essay will recount a
small sample of the restrooms-as-intimate trope. It will then take
up different possible meanings of “intimate” in this context:
intimacy as relational, as a sharing of personal information, as
emotional safety, and as in intimate anatomical parts. This Essay
will also show that these conceptions of “intimacy” fail to either
accurately describe common restrooms or justify denying
transgender persons gender-appropriate access to such facilities, or
both. Lastly, this Essay will address what may lie at the root of the
proliferating invocation of the restrooms-as-intimate trope.
I. Deployments of the Common-Restrooms-as-Intimate
Trope
Other than, perhaps, the restroom provision of North
Carolina’s HB2,12 which was but one part of an extremely pernicious
anti-civil-rights law,13 probably the most high-profile restroom
11. Michael Lipka, Americans Are Divided Over Which Public Restroom
Transgender People Should Use, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 3, 2016),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/03/americans-are-divided-overwhich-public-bathrooms-transgender-people-should-use/
[https://perma.cc/DE5ULXGT].
12. 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 3. HB2 required government buildings including public
schools and universities to sex-segregate multi-user restrooms and locker rooms, and
to limit access to such facilities by “biological sex.” Id. at §§ 1.1–1.3. HB2’s full title
is “An Act to Provide for Single-Sex Multiple Occupancy Bathroom and Changing
Facilities in Schools and Public Agencies and to Create Statewide Consistency in
Regulation of Employment and Public Accommodations.” 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 3.
13. For example, HB2 repealed the municipal laws of Charlotte and six other
local governments that prohibit sexual orientation and gender identity
discrimination, and preempts any such local laws that might in the future be
adopted. Id. § 3.1. As originally enacted, it eliminated private employees’ ability to
sue to vindicate their state law rights against discrimination based on race, national
origin, religion, color, age, or sex. Id. at § 3.2; see generally Brian Clarke, Employment
Law Easter Eggs in North Carolina’s HB 2, PRAWFSBLOG (Mar. 29, 2016, 8:00 AM),
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dispute came out of Virginia, the home of high school student and
transgender boy Gavin Grimm, as noted in the Introduction.14
Although he initially used the boy’s restroom without incident,15
complaints, seemingly originating from some parents, led the
School Board to adopt a policy limiting restroom use by the
undefined notion “biological gender.”16 As a result of this policy,
Gavin was barred from using the common restrooms reserved for
boys at his school.17 He sued and secured a preliminary injunction
from the Fourth Circuit on his claim under Title IX,18 but the
Supreme Court stayed that order and granted certiorari.19 After the
Education and Justice Departments under Trump withdrew the
Guidance that had interpreted Title IX to protect appropriate
restroom access for transgender students,20 the Supreme Court
vacated the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for fresh
consideration.21
The School Board’s final certiorari petition invoked the
common-restrooms-as-intimate trope twice. First, referring to
“restroom facilities” separated “on the basis of sex,” the petition
insisted that “[t]he biological differences between the sexes allow
government officials to separate men and women in such intimate
spaces.”22 Then, using quotation marks carefully to allow it to
deploy the adjective without technically (mis)representing that the
Supreme Court itself has embraced that characterization of
common restrooms, the petition writes: “This Court has already
recognized the need to ‘afford members of each sex privacy from the
other sex’ in intimate settings.”23
The School Board’s earlier Supreme Court brief, and those of
many of its amici, profligately deployed the “intimate” spaces trope.
From its first page the School Board sought to frame the case with
the trope: the School Board claimed that Title IX embodies the
principle “that in intimate settings men and women may be

https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/03/employment-law-easter-eggsin-north-carolinas-hb-2.html [https://perma.cc/4FWU-LEMQ].
14. See Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 3d 730 (E.D. Va. 2018).
15. Id. at 737–38.
16. Id. at 738.
17. Id.
18. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)).
19. Id. at 740.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 31 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 32 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,
550 n.19 (1996)).
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separated ‘to afford members of each sex privacy from the other
sex.’”24 Citing an influential 1971 law journal article that sought to
support the proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution
by limiting its scope in some respects, the School Board creatively
invoked Griswold v. Connecticut, a case about “marital bedrooms,”
for the importance of privacy rights “in intimate facilities such as
‘public rest rooms[.]’”25 The brief repeated this “intimate facilities”
characterization when it claimed that a requirement that
transgender persons be allowed appropriate restroom access would
lead either to the abolition of what Jacques Lacan26 called “urinary
segregation,”27 or to unseemly, case-by-case excretory admissibility
determinations, in my own terminology.
Alliance Defending Freedom, the School Board’s amicus and
architect of much anti-LGBTQ+ litigation,28 and two anti-LGBTQ+
groups, the National Organization for Marriage and the Center for
Constitutional Jurisprudence, repeatedly characterized restrooms
as “intimate facilities” in their Supreme Court briefs.29 Additional
amici of the School Board, the National School Boards Association
and the School Superintendents Association, similarly
characterized restrooms as “intimate settings.”30 Politicians and
government officials used the intimacy trope in amicus briefs as
well: eighty members of the United States Senate and House of
Representatives characterized restrooms as “intimate facilities,”31
24. Brief of Petitioner at 1, Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 3d 730 (No.
16-273) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 550 n.19).
25. Id. at 7 (emphasis added) (quoting Barbara A. Brown, Thomas I. Emerson,
Gail Falk & Ann E. Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis
for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 900–01 (1971) (citing Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965))). I note, though, that Brown et al., while relying
on the right of privacy, do not label public restrooms “intimate facilities.”
26. Mary Anne Case, Why Not Abolish Laws of Urinary Segregation?, in TOILET:
PUBLIC RESTROOMS AND THE POLITICS OF SHARING 211, 213 (Harvey Molotch &
Lauren Norén eds., 2010) (quoting Jacques Lacan, The Agency of the Letter in the
Unconscious or Reason Since Freud, 36/37 YALE FRENCH STUD.: STRUCTURALISM
112, 118 (1966)).
27. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 24, at 21–22.
28. Alliance Defending Freedom, SPLC, https://www.splcenter.org/fightinghate/extremist-files/group/alliance-defending-freedom
[https://perma.cc/JHC8HYUF].
29. Brief of Amicus Curiae Alliance Defending Freedom in Support of Petitioner,
Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (No. 16-273), 2017 WL
219353, at *4–5, *17; Brief of Amici Curiae National Organization for Marriage and
Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence in Support of Petitioner, Gloucester Cnty.
Sch. Bd., 137 S. Ct. 1239 (No. 16-273), 2017 WL 167307, at *1, *4.
30. Amici Curiae Brief of the National School Boards Association and AASA The
School Superintendents Association In Support of Petitioner, Gloucester Cnty. Sch.
Bd., 137 S. Ct. 1239 (No. 16-273), 2017 WL 128356, at *16.
31. Brief for Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
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as did U.S. Commission on Civil Rights conservatives Gail Heriot
and Peter Kirsanow,32 and an FBI agent and a sheriff writing as
“public safety experts.”33 Two nominally neutral amicus briefs
nonetheless supporting the exclusion of transgender girls and
women from women’s restrooms characterized those restrooms as
“intimate space”34 or “intimate settings.”35
One also sees the common-restrooms-as-intimate trope in
other litigation over access by transgender persons. The Highland
School District Board of Education repeatedly characterized girls’
restrooms as “intimate facilities”36 or “intimate environments.”37
The eleven states led by Texas that sued the federal government
and persuaded a receptive court38 to enjoin enforcement of the
federal government’s Guidance for how to treat transgender
students characterized restrooms as “intimate areas.”39 North
Carolinians for Privacy challenged that now-withdrawn Guidance,
characterizing restrooms as both “intimate environments”40 and
“intimate, vulnerable settings,”41 as did the plaintiff organization
Students and Parents for Privacy.42
Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 137 S. Ct. 1239 (No. 16-273), 2017 WL 192763, at *12.
32. Brief of Gail Heriot & Peter Kirsanow, Members, U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights, in Their Capacities as Private Citizens as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 137 S. Ct. 1239 (No. 16-273), 2017 WL 219354,
at *1, *3, *5–6, *22.
33. Brief of Amici Curiae Public Safety Experts in Support of Petitioner,
Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 137 S. Ct. 1239 (No. 16-273), 2017 WL 104592, at *1–2,
*4, *11.
34. Brief of Amicus Curiae David Boyle in Support of Neither Party, Gloucester
Cnty. Sch. Bd., 137 S. Ct. 1239 (No. 16-273), 2017 WL 344432, at *1, *3.
35. Brief of Amicus Curiae Safe Spaces for Women Supporting Neither Party,
Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 137 S. Ct. 1239 (No. 16-273), 2017 WL 74871, at *1–2.
36. Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶¶ 3, 228, Bd. of
Educ. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (No. 2:16-cv-524);
Reply in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 18, Bd. of Educ.,
208 F. Supp. 3d 850 (No. 2:16-cv-524).
37. Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 36, at ¶
32.
38. See Emma Platoff, By Gutting Obamacare, Judge Reed O’Connor Handed
Texas a Win. It Wasn’t His First Time., TEX. TRIB. (Dec. 19, 2018),
https://www.texastribune.org/2018/12/19/reed-oconnor-federal-judge-texasobamacare-forum-shopping-ken-paxton/ [https://perma.cc/52MK-8DH3] (discussing
the Texas Attorney General’s Office’s affinity for filing suit in O’Connor’s district).
39. Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Application for Preliminary Injunction at 14,
Texas v. United States, No. 7:16-cv-00054-O (N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2016).
40. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 58, N. Carolinians for
Privacy v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 5:16-cv-00845 (E.D.N.C. May 10, 2016).
41. Id. at ¶¶ 121, 202–03, 205.
42. Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at ¶ 263, Students
and Parents for Privacy v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 1:16-cv-4945 (N.D. Ill. May 4,
2016).
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And the trope is ubiquitous outside litigation as well. For
example, when Texas Lieutenant Governor Dan Patrick and Texas
State Senator Lois Kolkhorst unveiled SB6, which would have43
prevented transgender Texans from using public bathrooms
matching their gender identity and which passed the Texas Senate
21-10, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton praised the bill because
“Texans should feel safe and secure when they enter any intimate
facility . . . .”44 Displaying a profound but too common
misunderstanding of gender identity, one letter to the editor of the
Wilmington Star News opined: “The demand that men who decide
to ‘identify’ as a woman be allowed to use intimate facilities
designated for women only is preposterous and outrageous.”45
II. Possible Significances of the Common-Restrooms-asIntimate Trope
The ubiquity of the common-restrooms-as-intimate trope
suggests that its propagators believe it supports their efforts to
deny transgender persons appropriate restroom access, whether by
providing justification or by framing effects. But is their
characterization correct? Are restrooms “intimate” spaces? If so, in
what sense? And, even if they are, what would follow from that?
Now, a concept like “intimacy” might not be definable in terms
of necessary and sufficient characteristics. Rather, since “the
meaning of a word comes from the way a word is used in
language,”46 legal privacy scholar Daniel Solove observes that
“certain concepts might not share one common characteristic;
rather they draw from a common pool of similar characteristics, ‘a
complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing:
sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.’”47
Furthermore, I agree with Ethan Leib that “we probably should not
43. The bill was not enacted, and no explicit “bathroom bill” has been enacted in
Texas. Emma Platoff, Dan Patrick Says He Won the Fight Over the Bathroom Bill,
but at Schools Not Much Has Changed, TEX. TRIB. (Jan. 9, 2019),
https://www.texastribune.org/2019/01/09/texas-lt-gov-dan-patrick-dismisses-needbathroom-bill-2019/ [https://perma.cc/M9QT-YWAM].
44. Bobby Cervantes, Patrick, Kolkhorst Unveil ‘Bathroom Bill’ Aimed at
Transgender
Texans,
HOUS.
CHRON.
(Jan.
5,
2017),
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/politics/texas/article/Patrick-Kolkhorstunveil-bathroom-bill-aimed-10838579.php [https://perma.cc/W7CW-A2E6].
45. Letters to the Editor, WILMINGTON STAR NEWS ONLINE (Apr. 27, 2016)
(emphasis added), http://www.starnewsonline.com/opinion/20160427/letters-to-theeditor-april-27 [https://perma.cc/7PR5-7Q2N].
46. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1097 (2002).
47. Id. at 1097 (quoting LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS §§ 66–67 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1958)).
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collapse all forms of intimacy into one supervening category: the
intimacy within a good friendship may be different from the
intimacy within the home, which may be different from the intimacy
at the workplace.”48 But it is not clear that restrooms should be
adjudged “intimate” in any conception of the term. Conceptions of
intimacy as relational, as a sharing of personal information, as
emotional safety, and as in intimate parts either fail to accurately
describe common restrooms or to justify denying transgender
persons appropriate access, or both.
A. Common Restrooms and Intimacy as Relational
One sense of intimacy has to do with interpersonal
relationships. To quote Lauren Berlant, the notion of intimacy
“involves an aspiration for a narrative about something shared, a
story about both oneself and others . . . .”49 Solove has argued that
“[i]ntimacy captures the dimension of the private life that consists
of close relationships with others . . . .”50 Philosopher Julie Inness
has similarly argued that “intimate matters or acts draw ‘their
value and meaning from the agent’s love, care, or liking.’”51 To
comparable effect, legal philosopher Jeff Reiman has argued “that
what constitutes intimacy is not merely the sharing of otherwise
withheld information, but the context of caring which makes the
sharing of personal information significant.”52 This conception of
intimacy accords with perhaps one of the most famous invocations
of the intimate in U.S. constitutional law: Griswold v. Connecticut’s
declaration that marriage is a relationship “intimate to the degree
of being sacred.”53
On an understanding of intimacy as relational, restrooms
would not generally be intimate spaces. While we may routinely
encounter familiar faces in a men’s or women’s restroom in our
schools or workplaces, such repeat players are less likely to be
common in the myriad other venues in which we use restrooms (e.g.,
restaurants, department stores, shopping malls, stadiums,
48. Ethan J. Leib, Work Friends: A Commentary on Laura Rosenbury’s Working
Relationships, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 149, 155 (2011).
49. Lauren Berlant, Intimacy: A Special Issue, 24 CRITICAL INTIMACY 281, 281
(1998).
50. Solove, supra note 46, at 1124.
51. Id. at 1122 (quoting JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 78
(1992)).
52. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy,
Intimacy, and Personhood, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY 300, 305
(Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984)).
53. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
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courthouses, county clerks’ offices, etc.). Rather, restrooms are open
to the public, and we routinely share them not with people who
might be considered intimates, but with strangers. We do not, I
believe, ordinarily consider ourselves to be in close relationships
with these to whom we may not speak, with whom we generally are
not having sex, with these people whose faces we might not even
see as we pass in common restrooms. These are not generally our
husbands, wives, spouses, girlfriends, boyfriends, or BFFs, nor does
the experience of sharing these multi-user facilities ordinarily
result in an intimate bond.
B. Common Restrooms and Intimate Information
A second, not wholly distinct sense of intimacy has to do with
“intimate information.” Legal philosopher Charles Fried treats
“‘intimate’ information” as “information necessary to form and
foster relationships involving respect, love, friendship, and trust.”54
Certainly the state of one’s genitalia might be considered “intimate”
information—it is information about body parts often considered
“intimate” with which physical contact is shared restrictively. But,
while recognizing that my knowledge of practices in women’s
restrooms is overwhelmingly derivative and not first-hand, the
general point of restrooms is not to share such information.
Indeed, urinal shields in men’s restrooms and toilet stalls in
men’s and women’s restrooms are designed precisely to preclude or
reduce the sharing of such information. Common restrooms do not
conduce self-revelation of that kind. Moreover, most transgender
people are not rushing to “share” such “intimate” information about
themselves; witness, for example, Janet Mock’s rejection of Piers
Morgan’s questioning her about her anatomical details.55 As
transgender people in some of the restroom litigation have argued,
it is not sharing restrooms that facilitates sharing of “intimate”
information. Rather, it is requirements—such as North Carolina’s
HB2—that people use restrooms consistent not with their gender
identity but with their “biological sex,” curiously and positivistically
defined as the sex assigned on one’s birth certificate,56 that threaten
to out many transgender persons as transgender, implicating their

54. Solove, supra note 46, at 1111.
55. CNN, Janet Mock Joins Piers Morgan, YOUTUBE (Feb. 5, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=btmMVM23Ekk.
56. See An Act to Provide for Single-sex Multiple Occupancy Bathroom and
Changing Facilities in Schools and Public Agencies and to Create Statewide
Consistency in Regulation of Employment and Public Accommodations, N.C. Session
Law 2016-3, § 1.2 (Mar. 23, 2016) (adding G.S. 115C-521.2(a)(1) to state law).
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birth anatomy and breaching the secrecy with which people often
treat their genitals.
C. Common Restrooms and Intimacy as Emotional Refuge
Nor does a conception of intimacy as “emotional safety”
succeed in rendering common restrooms “intimate” spaces, pace
such appeals in various disputes over transgender persons’
restroom access. Washington State Representative Luanne Van
Werven, for example, argued that the now-withdrawn Obama
administration Education Department/Department of Justice
Guidance invaded the privacy of cisgender57 persons by “[m]aking
children, the elderly and the disabled share restrooms . . . with the
opposite sex” when they “deserve to feel safe in intimate
settings . . . .”58 She was appealing to a notion of intimacy as
emotional safety. Therapist Thomas Fitzpatrick has argued that
“emotional safety is intimacy, the thing we most seek in a
relationship.”59 Yet these are not feelings common restrooms
routinely arouse. They are too often not comforting, but rather
unclean, odoriferous, and harshly or otherwise ill-lit. Moreover, the
very fact that defenders of denying appropriate access to
transgender persons rely on safety as justification, or rather,
rationalization—acknowledging that batteries and other serious
crimes do occur in common restrooms—makes common restrooms,
like so many other spaces public or private, places of risk, not safety.
To the extent that (some) women may conceive of common
restrooms as a “safe space” or “haven,” “a place to escape from a

57. “Cisgender” commonly refers to persons whose gender identity matches the
sex assigned to them at birth, the complement of transgender persons. See, e.g.,
Sophie Saint Thomas, What Does It Mean to Be Cisgender?, COSMOPOLITAN (Nov. 24,
2018), https://www.cosmo.ph/relationships/cisgender-meaning-definition-src-intl%
20-a898-20181124?ref=feed_1
[https://perma.cc/6JSJ-TB8V]
(“[C]isgender . . . means you agree . . . with the gender you were assigned at birth.”
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Jimanekia Eborn, sex educator and trauma
specialist)); see also A. Finn Enke, The Education of Little Cis: Cisgender and the
Discipline of Opposing Bodies, in TRANSFEMINIST PERSPECTIVES IN AND BEYOND
TRANSGENDER AND GENDER STUDIES 60, 61 (Anne Enke ed., Temple University
Press 2012) (recounting use of “cisgender to describe the condition of staying with
birth-assigned sex, or congruence between birth-assigned sex and gender identity”).
58. Rep. Luanne Van Werven Says New Transgender Restroom, Locker Room
Rule Needs to be Repealed, WASH. STATE HOUSE REPUBLICANS (Jan. 7, 2016),
https://luannevanwerven.houserepublicans.wa.gov/2016/01/07/rep-luanne-vanwerven-says-new-transgender-restroom-locker-room-rule-needs-to-be-repealed/
[https://perma.cc/7EV6-Q2HW].
59. Thomas C. FitzPatrick, Making Marriage Work, 87 MICH. BAR J. 42, 43
(2008).
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browbeating boss or importunate suitor,”60 feminist legal scholar
Mary Anne Case’s responses seem apt. First, Professor Case has
observed that “at least for some, the colored restroom could serve
much the same function in the Jim Crow South,”61 and that notions
of contamination underlie both forms of restroom segregation,
racial and gendered.62 Further, Case notes that “[a] woman can
escape her boss in the office women’s room only if the bosses are
men. The flip side of this safe space for female subordinates is a safe
space for male bosses, free from the intrusion of women seeking
professional advancement.”63 For women with woman bosses,
however, restrooms are scant haven.64 Similarly, though Case does
not make this point in exact terms, respite from “suitors” is only
available in common restrooms from suitors of a different sex; a
women’s restroom simpliciter shields no woman from a female
suitor, just as a men’s room without more shields no man from a
male suitor.65
So, to the extent there may be some emotional safety aspect to
common restrooms, it trades on occupational sex stratification and
on the privileging of different-sex dating and the interests of
heterosexually-identified persons over same-sex dating or the
interests of gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons. Neither such
oversimplification of the gendered contours of workforces nor such
naked heterosexism should be understood as a persuasive
justification for excluding transgender persons from restrooms
consistent with their gender identity, let alone the “exceedingly
persuasive justification” demanded of sex-discriminatory laws by
equal protection doctrine.66 And, of course more fundamentally,
opponents have not explained how affording transgender persons
gender-appropriate access would impair any sanctuary function of
restrooms.

60. Case, supra note 26, at 221.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 211–12.
63. Id. at 223.
64. Id.
65. “Suitor” may be too romantic a term to describe some persons who may be
looking primarily to have sex with the social “refugee” at issue.
66. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (reiterating that
government must provide an exceedingly persuasive justification to sustain action
based on sex classifications challenged as denying equal protection (citing
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982))).
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D. Common Restrooms and “Intimate Parts”
Now, there is also a sense of “intimate” that refers to certain
anatomical parts of persons, most particularly genitalia but also
female breasts, sometimes anuses, and perhaps buttocks.67 For
example, in her article Plotting Privacy as Intimacy, Heidi Reamer
Anderson treats “bodily intimacy” as an important “objective
indicator[]” of intimacy,68 though she too talks about “intimate body
parts”69 without defining them or explaining in what sense these
parts are intimate. Professor Anderson does assert, without
defense, that “sexual organs” (by which I’m guessing maybe she
means genitalia, though there is a question whether she also would
include bodily parts such as Fallopian tubes) are “the most intimate
of body parts.”70 Are common restrooms “intimate spaces” because
most people who use them for excretion do so using what might be
considered “intimate” body parts?
I think not. Again, the point of common bathroom architecture
and U.S. custom is that we excrete in private. Setting aside trough
urinals, which are not provided in women’s rooms (if built as such)
and which we would not expect those transgender men with
genitalia traditionally regarded as female to use, restrooms
facilitate shielding one’s genitalia (and one’s buttocks and anus)
from view. If the mere thought that a transgender person with
genitalia or “intimate parts” different from one’s own might be using
a neighboring stall upsets a person, it is hard to see why the law
ought to throw its weight behind such literally disturbed thoughts.
Transgender and gender-nonconforming people have reported the
hostility they’ve faced when using restrooms deemed “proper” for
them based on sex assigned at birth.71 Regardless of these harms,
67. None of the federal Fourth Amendment cases I’ve found that use the terms
“intimate parts” or “intimate body parts” actually define the phrases, nor do the few
state statutes I’ve examined. There’s even a question in case law whether internal
organs should be considered intimate body parts subject to special Fourth
Amendment protection.
68. Heidi Reamer Anderson, Plotting Privacy as Intimacy, 46 IND. L. REV. 311,
315 (2013).
69. Id. at 319.
70. Id. at 326.
71. Zack Ford, Study: Transgender People Experience Discrimination Trying to
Use Bathrooms, THINK PROGRESS (June 26, 2013), https://archive.thinkprogress.org/
study-transgender-people-experience-discrimination-trying-to-use-bathrooms34232263e6b3/ [https://perma.cc/K6WK-ZJVA] (citing a study demonstrating that
70% of transgender individuals in the Washington, D.C., area experienced some form
of discrimination or harassment while using restrooms); Nico Lang, What It’s Like to
Use a Public Bathroom While Trans, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 31, 2016),
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/what-its-like-to-use-a-publicbathroom-while-trans-65793/ [https://perma.cc/2VAZ-AD7T].
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to make transgender people use common restrooms inconsistent
with their gender identity does not protect the privacy of anyone’s
“intimate parts.”
Water closets are where we closet our excretory activity. One
can see how spouses or romantic partners voiding in the presence
and in sight of their partner in a bathroom in their home, for
example, might be viewed as engaging in intimate activity. And
because of the conventionally closeted nature of the activity, one
person assisting another with their literal toileting might similarly
be adjudged “intimate.” But co-presence, so often with strangers, in
different stalls in a common restroom does not by itself seem
particularly intimate. True, our society has conventions that many
such facilities are sex-segregated, but it does not appear that such
gendered privacy is protecting “intimacy.” “Private” and “intimate”
are not the same thing. There are lots of things people may do in
private that are not especially intimate, so our traditions of
excretory privacy do not mean that tending to one’s excretory (by
which I mean to include menstrual) needs in stalls in common
restrooms is intimate activity.
III. Common Restrooms and “Making Sex Matter”
Given the failures of numerous ways to try to understand the
notion that common restrooms are “intimate spaces,” why then are
so many opponents of transgender persons’ using gender-identityconsistent restrooms invoking “intimacy,” characterizing restrooms
as “intimate spaces,” “intimate settings,” or “intimate facilities”? I
think it is in part because they know at some level that transgender
persons are not, as such, threats to their excretory privacy or any
other version of intimacy that might plausibly occur in restrooms.
It is not the boundaries of “the private” or even really “the intimate”
in any sense that are at stake in questions of who may access which
common restrooms under what conditions. It is the boundaries of
gender being contested, and continued efforts to instill gendered
intimacy within sex-based classes—to make sex matter in a time
when sex’s social or public significance may seem greatly
diminished compared to the past.
Opponents do not accept transgender women as women, or
transgender men as men. I know this is obvious on one level just
from the terms of these laws, which may, like North Carolina’s,
provide for the first time a prescriptive definition of the two most
commonly perceived sexes72 and preclude local jurisdictions from
72. See, e.g., Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female are
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embracing a different conception of sex. But I think that the
“intimate spaces” trope underscores part of why opponents think
sex-segregation is valuable: not just to protect gendered privacy, but
gendered intimacy, or rather, the intimacy of gender. It is an
intimacy, even if phantasmatic, that one imagines one shares by
virtue of a common sex.
Unsurprisingly, laws predicated upon an imagined gendered
intimacy are often not ideologically pure. Like most values, the
perceived value of gendered intimacy yields when it conflicts
sufficiently with the interests of those within the ambit of
lawmakers’ concern and respect—an attitude which too often is
denied to transgender persons. Consider, for example, Texas Senate
Bill 6, approved by its Senate though ultimately not signed into
law.73 It first would have barred local jurisdictions from regulating
use of restrooms and certain other facilities,74 and required public
school districts, certain charter schools, local jurisdictions, and
state agencies broadly defined75 to restrict their common restrooms
and other facilities by “biological sex,”76 defined in oddly positivistic
terms as “the physical condition of being male or female, which is
stated on a person’s birth certificate.”77 But a later section of the bill
made an exception for parents and authorized caregivers, school
employees, and authorized school volunteers “to accompany a
student needing assistance in using” common restrooms at
schools,78 and allowed a child under age 8 to enter gendered
government restrooms with an accompanying person who is caring
for the child.79 Other anti-trans bathroom laws, like the one enacted

Not Enough, THE SCIENCES, Mar.–Apr. 1993, at 20, 20–25. But see Leonard Sax, How
Common Is Intersex? A Response to Anne Fausto-Sterling, 39 J. SEX RSCH. 174, 174
(2002) (criticizing Fausto-Sterling’s definition of intersex and characterization of sex
as a continuum rather than a dichotomy).
73. S.B. 6, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017). See supra note 43 and accompanying
text.
74. Id. at § 3 (adding section 250.008(b) to Chapter 250 of the Texas Local
Government Code).
75. See id. at § 5 (adding section 769.001(8) to Title 9 of the Texas Health and
Safety Code).
76. Id. (adding sections 769.051 and 769.101 to Title 9 of the Texas Health and
Safety Code).
77. Id. (adding section 769.001(1) to Title 9 of the Texas Health and Safety Code).
78. Id. (adding section 769.053(4) to Title 9 of the Texas Health and Safety Code).
79. Id. (adding section 769.104(2) to Title 9 of the Texas Health and Safety Code).
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for a time in Oxford, Alabama,80 have contained similar
exemptions.81
Perhaps “immature” genitalia impair intimacy, real or
imagined, less than mature genitalia, and to the extent misplaced
fears of sexual molestation have been sincere, that may describe
some opponents’ feelings. But, strikingly, the Texas school
exception as written lets a “biological male” father with mature
genitalia accompany his “biological female” daughter into girls’ or
women’s restrooms if she needs assistance using them.82 In general
it seems likely that the supporters of these legislative exemptions
have not thought through their beliefs about intimacy and
restrooms, that they are accustomed to parents taking children into
common restrooms regardless of the children’s gender, and that, at
least as a matter of revealed preferences, they value the
convenience of heterosexually-identified parents—whose situations
they readily grasp—more than the safety and wellbeing of
transgender persons, about whom so many are so ill-informed.
I recognize this next observation likely will be contentious, but
these caregiver exemptions from trans-exclusive sex-segregated
restroom laws in some ways echo Louisiana’s railroad racial
segregation law disgracefully upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Plessy v. Ferguson.83 That statute’s first section required passenger
railways to provide “equal but separate accommodations for the
white, and colored races,” and its first and second section required
officers of the passenger trains to enforce those exclusions.84 Yet its
third section provided an exemption for “nurses attending children
of the other race.”85 As Justice Harlan recognized in his deeply
flawed but important dissent, the statute’s overall purpose, “was,
under the guise of giving equal accommodation for whites and
blacks, to compel the latter to keep to themselves while traveling in
railroad passenger coaches.”86 The act thereby limited the reach of
80. See Ashley Fantz, Anti-trans Bathroom Ordinance Repealed in Oxford,
Alabama, CNN (May 5, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/05/05/us/oxfordtransgender-bathroom-repeal [https://perma.cc/DXA4-EZ5K] (reporting 3-2 repeal of
ordinance unanimously adopted the previous week but not yet signed by mayor).
81. For an ad hominem and infelicitously entitled blog post noting this exception,
see Evan Hurst, Inbred Alabama Hicks Can’t Even Spell Why They Hate
Transgenders
So
Much,
WONKETTE
(Apr.
27,
2016),
https://www.wonkette.com/inbred-alabama-hicks-cant-even-spell-why-they-hatetransgenders-so-much [https://perma.cc/8WW2-FPK6].
82. S.B. 6. § 769.053(4)(b).
83. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
84. Id. at 540–41.
85. Id. at 541.
86. Id. at 557.
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its discriminatory racial exclusion command in the service of the
convenience of children’s caregivers. These modern exemptions
from restroom exclusion laws make similar child-focused
exemptions from the gendered “intimacy” invoked, pretextually or
unreflectively, by some defenders of these measures.
Conclusion
The “intimacy” defenses of laws seeking to make gender
identity an insufficient basis for assigning transgender persons to
particular gendered common restrooms fail. The Supreme Court
does not currently have before it a case concerning whether federal
statutory bans on sex discrimination or the Equal Protection Clause
require that transgender people be able to use gender-appropriate
common restrooms. The Court expressly did not reach the question
whether the ban on sex discrimination in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) requires such access for workers when
it decided Bostock v. Clayton County in June 2020.87 But it did not
need to do so in that case, and the now late Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, who joined the Bostock majority in holding that firing
“someone simply for being . . . transgender” discriminates on the
basis of sex in violation of Title VII,88 has been replaced by
conservative jurist Amy Coney Barrett. Although the Supreme
Court ultimately closed its doors to the Gloucester County School
Board as it sought to vindicate its exclusion of Gavin Grimm, who
is no longer in high school, from common boy’s restrooms, we could
see the Court take up the common restroom issue sooner rather
than later. If it does, the Justices should not be led astray by the
“intimate spaces” characterization of restrooms.
Opponents of gender-appropriate use of common restrooms by
transgender persons often appear taken aback when confronted
with the reality of the people who would have to use men’s rooms or
women’s rooms under their benighted proposals: conventionally,
binary-gendered trans men who look like other masculine men in
women’s rooms or conventionally, binary-gendered trans women
who look like other feminine women in men’s rooms.89 Yet in Texas
87. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1753 (2020).
88. Id. at 1737.
89. See, e.g., Justin Wm. Moyer, Why Houston’s Gay Rights Ordinance Failed:
Fear of Men in Women’s Bathrooms, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/11/03/why-houstonsgay-rights-ordinance-failed-bathrooms/ [https://perma.cc/7E34-2ZPK] (discussing
political arguments behind Houston’s HERO repeal); Marie-Amélie George, Framing
Trans Rights, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 555, 559 (2019) (describing and critiquing LGBTQ+
rights groups’ “assimilationist” use of “all-but-fully transitioned, conventionally
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and other places opponents persist; they support and vote for these
laws. Even when someone like Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton
recognizes that trans people have been using restrooms consistent
with their gender identity for many years, and will likely do so going
forward—perhaps because to do otherwise might threaten their
safety or even lives—he nonetheless supports these laws.90 Under
such circumstances, it’s hard to deny that the, or at least a, point of
these laws is precisely to mark transgender persons as not
intimates, as not even part of the respectable community, by
rendering them lawbreakers. It was hardly a defense of sodomy
laws to point out that they would often be disregarded; they
rendered otherwise law-abiding persons outlaws for no good reason.
That is what trans-exclusionary restroom laws do, and that is an
important reason informed people of good will, transgender or
cisgender, binary gender or nonbinary, ought to do what we can to
oppose such measures.

attractive men and women” in campaigns against measures targeting sexual
orientation-and-gender identity antidiscrimination rules).
90. See Cervantes, supra note 44.

